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Trial Tactics

Federal Rule of Evidence
408 and Criminal Cases
BY stephen a. Saltzburg

H

ow does Fed. R. Evid. 408 operate in
a criminal case? This is a question that
few lawyers have had occasion to ask
in their careers and even fewer have had occasion to answer. There are two principal reasons:
First, because Rule 408 deals with offers to compromise civil disputes while Fed. R. Evid. 410 is
the rule that focuses on plea bargaining and compromising criminal cases; and second, prior to
an amendment of Rule 408 a number of federal
courts held that it simply had no applicability in
criminal prosecutions. Although the cases disagreed on the applicability of Rule 408 in criminal cases, there were so few cases involving the
rule that it simply was ignored by most lawyers
and judges handling criminal cases. Once Rule
408 was amended in 2006, it became clear on the
face of the rule that it reached criminal prosecutions, and it also became clear that, even though
it may not be invoked frequently in criminal cases,
prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges have to
understand how it works.

An Illustrative Case

United States v. Davis, 596 F.3d 852 (D.C. Cir.
2010), illustrates in part the kind of protection
that Rule 408 can afford a criminal defendant
who seeks to exclude evidence of an offer to settle
what appeared to be a civil dispute. An earlier
article discussed the case in connection with the
intersection of personal knowledge, hearsay, and
best evidence objections, but a brief description
of the facts is in order to set the stage for the discussion of the Rule 408 issue.
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, a pastchair of the Criminal Justice Section,
is the Wallace and Beverley Woodbury
University Professor at George Washington
University School of Law in Washington,
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Terry Davis had been the national treasurer
of the Phi Beta Sigma fraternity. He was charged
with 10 counts of bank fraud, one count of firstdegree theft, and one count of first-degree fraud.
A jury acquitted him on two bank fraud counts
and convicted him on all the other counts.
The fraternity, founded at Howard University in
1914, has university and alumni chapters with more
than 120,000 members who pay annual dues that
are deposited in a general fund bank account and
used to pay the fraternity’s operating expenses. Davis was an elected, unpaid officer of the fraternity.
He disregarded the fraternity’s policy with respect
to authorization of vouchers to pay expenses and
signatures on checks. He wrote checks without obtaining approved vouchers, and sometimes failed to
obtain the cosignature required on the checks.
When the fraternity investigated financial irregularities and discovered what Davis had done,
it suspended him and installed a new treasurer,
Jimmy Hammock, who found at least $29,000 in
checks that had been made out to cash that was
not deposited in the fraternity’s bank account.
These checks gave rise to the prosecution.

The Rule 408 Issue

Hammock testified as follows: He asked Davis to
produce the financial records Davis maintained
on the fraternity’s behalf. Davis provided some unused checks and financial reports but no cancelled
checks or bank statements. He also asked Davis
why he had written fraternity checks payable to
cash, and Davis explained that he transferred the
funds to the fraternity’s payroll account.
Davis filed a motion in limine seeking to bar
Hammock from testifying about his second conversation with Hammock. The defense motion
quoted the following portion of an FBI report of
an interview with Hammock:
Sometime between the National Conclave and
August 2003, HAMMOCK had a telephone
conversation with DAVIS, during which he
confronted DAVIS about the checks made
payable to cash and DAVIS’ explanation
[that] the money was deposited to the payroll
account. DAVIS said the money had been deposited into the payroll account, but HAMMOCK replied “TERRY, I’m telling you,
I’ve gone through the records and it didn’t.”
DAVIS then unexpectedly said “what will it
take to make this go away?” HAMMOCK
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responded that DAVIS needed to repay “whatever you took.” DAVIS asked “what if I split the
$29,000?” HAMMOCK told DAVIS the
amount of missing money was in excess of
$100,000.00, to which DAVIS responded,
“Oh, I can’t pay that much.”
Davis’s motion relied upon Fed. R. Evid. 408:
(a) Prohibited uses.—Evidence of the following is not admissible on behalf of any
party, when offered to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of a claim that was
disputed as to validity or amount, or to
impeach through a prior inconsistent statement or contradiction:
(1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish—or accepting or offering or promising to
accept—a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and
(2) conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations regarding the claim, except
when offered in a criminal case and the negotiations related to a claim by a public office
or agency in the exercise of regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority.
(b) Permitted uses.—This rule does not require
exclusion if the evidence is offered for purposes
not prohibited by subdivision (a). Examples
of permissible purposes include proving a witness’s bias or prejudice; negating a contention
of undue delay; and proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
The trial judge rejected the motion, and Hammock testified about a second conversation with
Davis regarding these checks. Hammock said that
told he Davis the fraternity had found $29,000 in
checks made out to cash, none of which was deposited in the fraternity’s bank account, and that
Davis asked “Can we just split this $ 29,000.00
and make this situation just go away?” According
to Hammock, he told Davis “[the] amount was
in excess of a hundred thousand dollars,” Davis
said, “I can’t afford to pay that amount,” and
Hammock finished the conversation by telling
Davis that “Terry, if you want to do some—negotiate some kind of settlement, you need to talk to
our legal counsel or our international president.”

Were Davis’s Statements Offers to Settle?

Davis claimed that his statements amounted to an

offer to settle a claim that was disputed as to validity. The trial judge rejected the argument, but
the court of appeals agreed with Davis as it said
the following:
There can be no doubt that Davis offered
to compromise a disputed claim. His offer
was to split the $29,000 in checks to cash
he thought the fraternity had discovered. . . .
Davis did not confess to taking the fraternity’s money; he said that he had deposited
the cash checks into the fraternity’s payroll
account; and Hammock rejected Davis’s explanation. . . . It is also clear that the government intended to introduce Davis’s settlement offer in order to prove Davis’s guilt, or
in the words of Rule 408(a), his “liability.’”
(506 F.3d at 859.)
The court reasoned that “[t]he Rule is meant
to promote settlements. . . . If one party attempts
to initiate negotiations with a settlement offer, the
offer is excluded from evidence even if the counterparty responds: ‘I’m not negotiating with you.’
It makes no sense to force the party who initiates negotiations to do so at his peril.” (Id.) Since
there was no doubt that Davis attempted to settle
the claim that Hammock made on behalf of the
fraternity, Davis was within the coverage of Rule
408 even if Hammock told him he would have to
negotiate with someone else.

Did Davis Offer a Valuable Consideration?

It is clear from Hammock’s testimony that Davis
offered to pay one-half of the $29,000 that was the
subjects of discussion between the two men. No
one could dispute that $14,500 has value. Nevertheless, the government argued that Davis did not
offer “valuable consideration” because Davis’s offer of $14,500 fell short of the $29,000 Hammock
said Davis owed. Thus, the government’s argument was that the consideration did not qualify
under Rule 408. The court of appeals made short
shrift of this argument by reasoning “[u]nder that
theory, only a settlement offer exceeding the full
amount of the disputed claim is an offer of valuable consideration,” and “[t]he framers of Rule 408
could not have intended any such thing.” (Id.)
The court of appeals’ reasoning is sound. The
government’s argument would essentially render
Rule 408 a nullity because anyone who offered
less than the other side claimed it was entitled to
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would not get the protection of Rule 408. This
would make settlement discussions risky rather
than safe as the drafters intended.

Was the Government’s Evidence
Admissible for Another Purpose?

The government also argued that Davis’s statements were admissible not to prove “liability”
but for another purpose. The court of appeals
explained the argument and rejected it as follows:
There is, as the government points out, a
sentence in the 1972 advisory committee
note to Rule 408 stating that an “effort to
‘buy off’ the prosecution or a prosecuting
witness in a criminal case is not within the
policy of the rule of exclusion.” FED. R.
EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note (1972
proposed rule). But it would be a mistake to
read much into that remark, particularly in
cases in which the defendant’s actions give
rise to potential civil and criminal liability.
The 2006 amendment to Rule 408, which
made clear that the rule applied to both civil
and criminal proceedings, drew a distinction
between civil disputes involving the government and civil disputes involving private parties. Under amended Rule 408, a defendant’s
statements in settlement negotiations with
government agencies may be admitted in a
criminal case. FED. R. EVID. 408(a)(2). But
if the civil dispute was with a private party,
the defendant’s offer of settlement and statements in negotiation may not be admitted
in a criminal prosecution when “offered to
prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of
a claim.” FED. R. EVID. 408(a).
(Id. at 860.)
The court concluded that the government was
trying to prove Davis’s guilt or “liability” through
his statements and did not seek to offer the statements for a limited purpose. Thus, the exclusionary rule of Rule 408 applied:
This still leaves the example in Rule 408(b)
allowing the use of a defendant’s settlement
offer and statements in negotiation in order
to prove the defendant’s attempt to obstruct
a criminal investigation. This example, and
the statement in the 1972 advisory notes, are
easy enough to understand when obstruction is

one of the criminal charges. . . . But even in such
cases there may be difficulties. One problem is
that settlement evidence, like other evidence,
may be introduced for multiple purposes, some
prohibited under Rule 408(a), some permitted under Rule 408(b). . . . Another problem
is whether the “obstruction” illustration
applies only to pending criminal investigations or also to potential investigations. In
Davis’s case, for instance, there was no date
identifying the beginning of a criminal investigation and there was no evidence indicating
that Davis knew of any criminal investigation
when he talked to Hammock. There may be
other difficulties in some cases. One might
suppose that if—as in this case—the same
acts give rise to potential civil and criminal
liability, any settlement of the civil dispute
could forestall or influence potential criminal proceedings. Yet to hold that offers of
settlement and negotiations in that context
amount to obstruction would be contrary to
the purpose of Rule 408 . . . and would contradict the notes of the advisory committee
in 2006.
Davis was not charged with obstructing a criminal investigation or attempting
to do so. We can say with some assurance
that when he offered to split the difference
on $29,000, he was not trying to bribe Hammock. All indications are that Davis was proposing to pay the money to the fraternity. It
may be that an offer of settlement, excessive
in amount, could be seen as an attempt to
“buy off” a complaining party. But Davis’s
offer obviously was not of that sort, which is
why Hammock rejected it out of hand.
The most important consideration is that
the government did not introduce the Hammock-Davis conversation for the purpose of
“proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation.” FED. R. EVID. 408(b). When
asked at oral argument whether this was the
government’s purpose, counsel for the government candidly admitted it was not. She
explained, as the prosecutor had argued to
the jury, that the conversation revealed Davis’s consciousness of guilt. But that is one
of the prohibited purposes in Rule 408(a).
Consciousness of guilt proves “liability” for
a disputed claim under Rule 408(a).
(Id. at 860-61.)
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The 2006 Advisory Committee Note to which
the court referred stated that if settlement offers
and negotiations between private parties were admissible, this would be contrary to the policy of
Rule 408 to avoid chilling such negotiations. Thus,
the court concluded not only that the government
had not offered the Rule 408 evidence to prove
an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation, but
also that there was no evidence in the case that
Davis was aware of any criminal investigation or
took any action that could fairly be said to be an
attempt to obstruct any such investigation.

The Conclusion

The court held that the trial judge abused discretion in admitting Davis’s settlement discussions.
Because both parties had mentioned those discussions in closing argument, the court found it difficult to determine whether or not the evidence was
prejudicial to Davis. The court therefore vacated
Davis’s convictions and remanded the case to the
trial judge for consideration in the first instance
of whether the error in admitting the settlement
evidence required reversal of the convictions.

Lessons

1. It is now clear that Rule 408 applies in criminal cases as well as in civil cases. The ambiguity that preceded the 2006 amendment to
Rule 408 has been removed.
2. Parties who desire to exclude evidence under Rule
408 are required to register timely objections or
make motions in limine as Davis did in this case.

3. An offer to settle qualifies under Rule 408
if there is a disputed claim as to validity or
amount and a party makes a genuine offer
to settle that claim even though the other
party does not want to negotiate.
4. An offer to settle a dispute involving money
involves valuable consideration even though
the offer is less than the other party believes
it is entitled to.
5. There is a difference under Rule 408 when a
party bargains about a claim with the government and when it bargains with private
parties. The rule puts potential criminal defendants on notice that statements made to
government agencies may be used against
them in criminal cases notwithstanding that
the statements were made in the course of
attempting to settle civil claims.
6. A party desiring to offer settlement discussions for a purpose other than to prove liability (or guilt) must make clear an intent to
offer the evidence for a limited purpose. The
government failed to do so in Davis’s case.
7. A party desiring to offer settlement discussions to prove something like an attempt to
obstruct a criminal investigation bears the
burden of showing that there was such an
attempt. In cases like Davis, where there
was no criminal investigation pending and
no evidence that Davis was contemplating a
criminal investigation or prosecution, meeting that burden might be difficult or even
impossible. n
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